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Abstract 
 
Nigeria has witnessed sustained and often co-ordinated attacks on innocent lives, valuable 
properties, government institutions, etc. by the Boko Haram sect since 2009. The iconoclastic and 
subversive activities of the sect has led to the deployment of the special Joint Task Force (JTF) 
comprising the military, police and intelligence personnel by the Nigerian government. Chapter 
Four of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, other laws established under it 
and several binding international human rights treaties clearly delineate the fundamental rights of 
the citizens. Ironically, these rights have come under severe abuse by members of the JTF drafted 
to restore public order in the terror-riddled states in northern Nigeria. This paper, therefore, 
analyzes the grossly under-reported role of the JTF, whose counter-insurgence operation in the 
preservation of national security largely contravenes the fundamental human rights of the citizens. 
Utilizing the Marxist theory of the state, the paper establishes that the counter-insurgence 
operation of the JTF is implicated in the wanton abuse of human rights in northern Nigeria. It 
concludes that the incidence of human rights violation in the region can only be eradicated 
through sustained rights advocacy and good governance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As the international community continues to grapple with global terrorism, Nigeria is bedevilled by 
the notoriously subversive activities of the home-grown sect, dubbed Boko Haram. The exact 
number of casualties credited to the sect is relatively unknown due to the dearth of information on 
the group. However, the large number of people who have died on account of the insurgence is 
cause for concern. Since July 2009, suspected members of Boko Haram, an armed Islamic group, 
have killed at least 1,500 people in northern and central Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, 2012:5). 
Similarly, the jihadists have been responsible for roughly 10,000 deaths since its founding in 2001 
(Allen, 2013). 
The sect’s attacks have primarily targeted innocent citizens, government institutions, security 
formations, religious organizations, educational institutions, media houses, beer halls, etc. So far, 
the government has concentrated its efforts at resolving the security challenge with the 
establishment and deployment of the Joint Task Force (JTF) to the terror-riddled states in what has 
become one of the largest peace time military operations in Nigeria. The deployment has not 
stopped the bombings but rather increased resentment in the local community where the force is 
located. The Nigerian government through the counter-insurgence operations of the JTF has killed 
hundreds of Boko Haram suspects and random members of communities where attacks occurred. 
The JTF has engaged in excessive use of force, physical abuse, secret detentions, extortions, 
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burning of houses, stealing of money during raids and extra-judicial killings of suspects (Human 
Rights Watch, 2012; Amnesty International, 2012). 
These counter-insurgence operations of the JTF have contravened the Force’s Rules of 
Engagement which according to the Code of Conduct for Nigerian Armed Forces Personnel on 
Internal Security & Aid to Civil Power Operations quoted in The National Human Rights Commission 
Report (2013:36) states inter alia that: 
In enforcing domestic law and order, members of the Nigerian Armed Forces shall use 
firearms as a last resort with maximum restraint, and respect for the principle of minimum force 
even in situations of self-defence. Force may only be used when absolutely necessary and to the 
extent required to perform their duty. 
Moreover, the activities of the force in the northern region have not only eroded the spirit of 
Section 14 (2) (b) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which makes the 
security and welfare of the people the primary purpose of government but also undermined the 
fundamental human rights of the citizenry as enshrined in Chapter Four of the document. They 
have equally negated other relevant laws established under the constitution as well as several 
international human rights treaties which the government has, at one time or the other, ratified. It 
is therefore ironical that the security agents who are statutorily responsible for the protection and 
preservation of the fundamental rights of the nationals are increasingly being indicted in the 
infraction of these rights. 
The abusive tactics of the JTF have strengthened the Islamist sect’s argument that it is 
battling government’s brutality. Indeed, the extra-judicial execution of the sect’s leader, 
Mohammed Yusuf, and dozens of other suspected members of the sect in July 2009 became a 
rallying cry for the group’s subsequent violent campaigns. Similarly, community members whose 
rights are frequently violated by the JTF are often unwilling to co-operate with security personnel 
and provide useful information about the insurgents. This impedes effective responses to the 
nefarious activities of the Islamist militants. 
The causative factors that instigated the origination and escalation of the Boko Haram 
insurgence have become a subject of intense disputation amongst scholars in the literature (see 
Nwanegbo & Odigbo, 2013; Copeland, 2013; Manni, 2012; Thomson, 2012; Ogundiya & Amzat, 
2008; Roman, 2012 and Adetoro, 2012). The insurgence has been associated with the perennial 
neglect of the socio-political and economic architecture of the country by successive 
administrations in Nigeria. The failure of leadership to transparently use public resources to 
ameliorate poverty and prevent all forms of socio-economic and political exclusions in the country 
underlies the insurgence. It is essentially fuelled by perennial failure of the political leadership to 
fight corruption, provide public services, create economic opportunities and establish accountable 
and effective security institutions. Accordingly, Clinton (2009:1) affirms that the most immediate 
source of disconnect between Nigeria’s wealth and its poverty is the failure of governance at the 
federal, state and local levels. 
Beyond econo-religious explanations however, Boko Haram is a terrorist group that romances 
with some desperate politicians in Northern Nigeria. The sect enjoys effective support from some 
well-to-do individuals, religious leaders, allies, admirers of their ideology and highly placed 
politicians in the North who claim to be Nigerians but are clandestinely working against the state 
(Nwanegbo & Odigbo, 2013:289). The group has transformed from a sect of Islamic fanatics to one 
with the overwhelming support of disgruntled politicians and other paid thugs who find the sect’s 
ideology appealing. It is now widely accepted as a destructive political tool with a cosmetic 
pretension to religiosity. The sect has provided a safe haven for disgruntled, deprived, desperate, 
frustrated and opportunistic politicians who were dislocated in the political configuration within the 
terror-infested states and the country at large. They hide under its umbrella, therefore, to 
perpetrate subversive acts with the ultimate goal of discrediting the President Goodluck Jonathan’s 
administration as fundamentally incapable of preserving the sovereign integrity of the nation. This 
largely explains the underlying reason behind the resurgence and escalation of Boko Haram 
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insurgence after the 2011 general election. 
From the extant literature, however, no work has substantially and systematically analyzed 
the implication of the grossly under-reported counter-insurgence operation of the JTF on human 
rights in Nigeria. The literature is rather replete with reports of occasional violations of the 
fundamental rights of the citizenry by the members of the JTF. Arising from the foregoing, 
therefore, this paper seeks to analyze and answer the question: does the wanton abuse of human 
rights by members of the JTF implicate the counter-insurgence operation in Northern Nigeria? It 
found that the operations of the security agents drafted to the hotbed of Boko Haram in Northern 
Nigeria have not only violated the rights of the citizenry but also intensified the insurgence. The 
paper which is divided into introduction, theoretical framework, the historical development of Boko 
Haram insurgence in Nigeria, the counter-insurgence operations of the JTF and human rights 
abuses in Nigeria, and conclusion and recommendation covers the counter-insurgence operation of 
the JTF between 12th June 2011 when the Force was established and the eve of the emergency 
rule of 14th May 2013 in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
In analyzing the phenomenon of human rights violation by members of the JTF in Northern Nigeria, 
the paper employs the Marxist theory of the state. The theory arises as a reaction to the Western 
liberal theory of the state which holds that the state is an independent force and a neutral observer 
that caters for the main interest of every member of the society. According to the Marxist theory, 
the state is a product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of class contradictions. It arises 
where, when and to the extent that class contradictions objectively cannot be reconciled (Lenin, 
1976:9). Thus, Engels cited in Lenin (1976:9) notes that: 
The state is, therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without...it is a product 
of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become 
entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it has split into irreconcilable opposites 
which it is powerless to conjure away. But in order that these opposites, classes with conflicting 
economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it became 
necessary to have a power seemingly standing above society that would moderate the conflict and 
keep it within the bounds of ‘order’; and this power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it, 
and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state. 
The state does not represent the general interest but the particular interest of the dominant 
ruling class. This state, which arose from the conflict between classes, is as a rule, the state of the 
most powerful, economically dominant class, which by this means also becomes the politically 
dominant class and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed 
(Jakubowski 1973:41). Accordingly, Marx and Engels (1973:35) aver that the executive of the 
modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. The 
state autonomy in the class society is therefore more apparent than real because the state remains 
the instrument of the dominant classes for exploiting and suppressing the subordinate classes. 
Meanwhile, the classical Marxist theory of the state has been further developed to take into 
consideration the peculiarity of the post-colonial states. For instance, Alavi (1973:146) contends 
that the classical Marxist view of the state is not fully applicable to the post-colonial states. This 
peculiar attribute of the post-colonial states can be traced to the colonial era. In order to secure 
their economic interests, the colonial government discouraged the emergence of a strong 
indigenous capitalist class. Worse still, the new indigenous bourgeoisie that inherited control over 
the post-colonial state apparatuses had a very weak economic base, and hence relied on this 
control for its own capital accumulation. Consequently, the state and its apparatuses, including 
members of the JTF have become the main instruments for the perpetuation and self-reproduction 
of the class interest. The states in peripheral social formations are considered inchoate and thus 
thrive on low autonomy. The persistence of deficient and brutal security personnel is largely a 
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product of low level of autonomy of the post-colonial states and indeed, the character of the 
Nigerian state. This low autonomization made it possible for the political leadership to use the JTF 
and other security agents to commit acts of criminality such as wanton abuse of the fundamental 
rights of the nationals. 
The role perception of the Nigerian security agents is inevitably shaped by its historical 
evolution as a colonial bequest. As a colonial force, the role of the security forces was largely to 
suppress, aggress, repress and oppress those opposed to the imposed authority of the colonialists. 
Consequently, it is widely accepted that even after over five decades of independence, the Nigerian 
security personnel still operates like an occupational force. This has culminated in a state of 
permanent hostility between the security agents and the citizenry. Correspondingly, the Nigerian 
state is used by the dominant ruling class to suppress the agitation, grievances and revolt from 
below—the lower classes. If there is no class to be suppressed by the ruling class, then state is not 
needed. Therefore, the use of state terror (state terrorism) is an offshoot of class society 
orchestrated by the dominant class to suppress the other classes. Although the official attempt to 
enforce the law necessarily carries with it certain coercive and punitive procedures which are, in 
the main, at variance with the guarantees stipulated in favour of the citizens by the constitution, 
the JTF’s penchant for brute and unbridled force is quite alarming. 
The establishment and deployment of the Force with the mandate of restoring law and order 
in the North-Eastern parts of Nigeria and Borno State in particular has heightened the incidents of 
rights violation in the region. The counter-insurgence operation of the JTF in the Boko Haram 
hotbed has not only intensified the militant activities of the sect but also seriously implicated 
human rights violations. Although this ignoble disposition of members of the force is rather ironical 
and contradictory to the internationally recognised and time-honoured responsibility of the security 
agencies in the protection and preservation of the rights of the citizenry, the practice however 
corresponds with the overall nature and character of the Nigerian state. The prevailing warped 
understanding of national security in the country which is usually elevated above the security of the 
nationals has become the greatest threat to the fundamental rights of the citizenry. It is therefore 
within the context of the specific character and nature of the post-colonial state of Nigeria that one 
can best understand and analyze the ugly incidents of human rights abuses by members of the JTF 
in terrorism-infested North-Eastern Nigeria. 
 
3. The Historical Development of Boko Haram Insurgence in Nigeria 
 
Boko Haram is an Islamist sect that came into the limelight in 2002 after co-ordinated attacks in 
Kanama (Yobe State) and Gwoza (Borno State). The sect founded by Ustadh Mohammed Yusuf in 
the North-Eastern part of Nigeria is officially recognised by its members as Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna 
Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, meaning “People committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings 
and Jihad.” The Hausa appellation “Boko Haram” is derived from its ideological orientation which 
forbids Western education and cultural practices. Thus, the sect advocates abolition of democratic 
governance and any man-made laws. 
According to Copeland (2013:1), some reports link the insurgency with earlier iterations of 
Islamist groups that opposed the Nigerian state but lacked the international notoriety of the current 
organization. The group has also been associated with small resistance groups composed of young 
men that began to congregate in the mid-1990s, led initially by Mallam Abubakar Lawan and later 
by the pseudonymous Aminu Tashen-Ilimi (Copeland, 2013; Roman, 2012). However, a coherent 
group identity could not be established until Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic Islamic cleric, gained 
prominence among local youths in Maiduguri, the Borno State capital. By 2003, Yusuf led a 
movement espousing a conservative theology that mimicked Saudi-style salafism and opposed 
Nigeria’s secular state which it considered corrupt and un-Islamic (Copeland, 2013:2). Over time, 
the sect demanded more economic and political reforms. The introduction of Islamic law (shar’a) in 
the twelve northern Nigerian states since 1999 was deemed insufficient by Yusuf and his followers, 
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who argued that the country’s ruling class as a whole was marred by corruption and even Muslim 
northern leaders were irredeemably tainted by “Western-style” ambitions (Pham, 2012:2). 
In a statement credited to Abu Qaqa in Daily Trust of April 25, 2011, the Islamist sect stated 
inter alia: 
We want to reiterate that we are warriors who are carrying out jihad (religious war) in Nigeria 
and our struggle is based on the traditions of the holy prophet. We will never accept any system of 
government apart from the one stipulated by Islam because that is the only way that the Muslims 
can be liberated. We do not believe in any system of government, be it traditional or orthodox 
except the Islamic system and that is why we will keep on fighting against democracy, capitalism, 
socialism and whatever. We will not allow the Nigerian Constitution to replace the laws that have 
been enshrined in the Holy Qur’an, we will not allow adulterated conventional education (Boko) to 
replace Islamic teachings. We will not respect the Nigerian Government because it is illegal. We will 
continue to fight its military and the police because they are not protecting Islam. We do not 
believe in the Nigerian judicial system and we will fight anyone who assists the government in 
perpetrating illegalities. 
It is expressly deducible from the above citation that Boko Haram is an Islamist 
fundamentalist sect. The sect could be arguably described as a ‘home-grown’ terrorist group that is 
headquartered in North-Eastern Nigeria. It is considered home-grown essentially because it arose 
from the neglect of the socio-political and economic architecture of the country by successive 
administrations. The leadership has failed to transparently use public resources to ameliorate 
poverty and prevent all forms of socio-economic and political exclusions in the country. The 
insurgence is primarily the result of the perennial failure of the political leadership to fight 
corruption, provide public services, create economic opportunities and establish accountable and 
effective security institutions. Accordingly, Clinton (2009:1) affirms that the most immediate source 
of disconnect between Nigeria’s wealth and its poverty is the failure of governance at the federal, 
state and local levels. Nonetheless, it is pertinent to note that domestic terrorism is not strictly 
separated from international terrorism because they are interwoven. Terrorist groups whose 
political agenda become localized to a certain political or national context tend to increasingly 
internationalize some of their logistics, fund raising as well as planning and other propaganda 
activities (Akpan, et al, 2012:70). The Nigerian case perfectly blends into this connectivity and the 
country has been on the throes of daring suicide bombers masquerading as Islamist Boko Haram 
adherents. 
However, Boko Haram is a terrorist group that romances with some desperate politicians in 
Northern Nigeria. It appears that the sect enjoys effective support from some well-to-do 
individuals, religious leaders, allies, admirers of their ideology and highly placed politicians in the 
North who claim to be Nigerians but are clandestinely working against the state (Nwanegbo & 
Odigbo, 2013:289). The group has transformed from a sect of Islamic fanatics to one with the 
overwhelming support of disgruntled politicians and other paid thugs who find the sect’s ideology 
appealing. It is now widely accepted as a destructive political tool with a cosmetic pretension to 
religiosity. 
The July 2009 uprising in Northern Nigeria marked a tipping point in the conflict between the 
sect and the government authorities. The brazen execution-style killings by both sides left more 
than 800 people dead in Borno, Bauchi, Yobe and Kano States (Human Rights Watch, 2012:32). 
From 2009 till date, the sect has engaged in arson, bombing, shooting and stabbing with disdain 
and impunity. The insurgents have attacked some strategic and high profile places/persons like the 
Nigeria Police Headquarters in Abuja on June 16, 2011; the UN House in Abuja on August 26, 
2011; St. Theresa Catholic Church, Madalla on December 25, 2011; This Day and The Sun 
Newspapers’ Offices in Abuja and Kaduna on April 26, 2012; the massacre of nine construction 
workers at the Shehu of Borno Central Mosque, Maiduguri on July 1, 2012; and the assassination of 
a respected elder statesman, Maj. Gen. Muhammadu Shuwa and his guest, Sagir Musa, on 
November 2, 2012 in Maiduguri. The activities of the insurgents have caused Nigeria an 
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irredeemable image crisis in the international community as well as engendered unprecedented 
humanitarian and economic catastrophe in the deeply affected states in Northern Nigeria. It is one 
of the greatest threats to the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI), sustenance of economic 
development and the actualization of the Nigeria Vision 20:2020 agenda. Accordingly, Adagba et al 
cited in Nwanegbo & Odigbo (2013: 289) assert that between July 27, 2009 and February 17, 
2013, Boko Haram has launched fifty three (53) attacks in which 1,157 people were killed and 
hundreds of people injured in Northern Nigeria. Table I below is a tabular representation of the 
chronological list of major Boko Haram attacks and the attendant consequences in Nigeria since 
2009. 
 
Table I: Chronology of Major Boko Haram Attacks 
 
S/N Date Activities Consequences 
1 
Between July 28 
and August 1, 
2009 
5 days of clashes between Boko Haram 
and government security forces in Borno, 
Bauchi, Kano and Yobe States 
More than 800 people died, including the 
sect’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf, who was 
summarily executed 
2 July 2010 Boko Haram began a campaign of increasingly deadly violence 
Assassination of police officers and Muslim 
critics in North-Eastern Nigeria 
3 September 7, 2010 
Boko Haram raided a prison in the city of 
Bauchi 
Freeing of more than 700 prisoners, 
including at least 100 members of the sect 
4 December 24, 2010 
Gun attacks on Christmas Eve on 2 
churches in Maiduguri and series of 
explosions in Christian neighbourhoods in 
Jos, Plateau State 
Death of a Christian cleric and 5 other 
Christians in Maiduguri. 33 people died in 
Jos, sparking a month of sectarian 
bloodletting which left another 200 deadȸ 
both Muslims and Christians 
5 December 31, 2010 
An explosion at an out-door beer garden 
on New Year’s Eve next to a military 
barracks in Abuja 
It killed at least 4 people 
6 April 8, 2011 
A bomb exploded at the office of the 
Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC) in Suleja, Niger State
It killed 16 people 
7 June 16, 2011 
A Boko Haram suicide car bomber 
detonated a car bomb in the parking lot 
of the police headquarters, Abuja 
At least 2 persons were killed 
8 August 26, 2011
A Boko Haram suicide car bomber 
attacked the United Nations House in 
Abuja 
25 persons were killed while more than 100 
persons were injured 
9 November 4, 2011 
Boko Haram attacked government 
security targets, banks, and churches in 
Damaturu, Yobe State 
More than 100 people were left dead 
10 December 25, 2011 
A Christmas day suicide bomber 
detonated a car bomb outside St. 
Theresa Catholic Church Madalla, Niger 
State 
26 worshippers and 17 bystanders were 
killed 
11 January 20, 2012 
Boko Haram launched co-ordinated 
attacks on police facilities in the city of 
Kano 
The attacks left 185 people dead 
12 February 16, 2012 
Boko Haram prison break in Lokoja, Kogi 
State 119 prisoners released and 1 warder killed 
13 March 8, 2012 
A British rescue mission against Boko 
Haram hostages, Franco Lamolinara and 
Christopher McManus failed 
The 2 foreign hostages were killed 
14 April 8, 2012 
A suicide car bomber detonated a bomb 
on Easter Day along a busy street in the 
city of Kaduna 
At least 41 people were killed 
15 April 26, 2012 
A suicide car bomber detonated a bomb 
at the This Day Newspaper Offices in 
Abuja and Kaduna 
At least 7 people were killed 
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16 April 29, 2012 Gunmen attacked two churches at Bayero University, Kano 
At least 19 people were killed, including 2 
professors 
17 September 2012 
Boko Haram members carried out series 
of attacks on more than 24 mobile 
telephone towers in at least 7 northern 
states 
Severing of telecoms services in the states 
18 October 3, 2012
Boko Haram members attacked the town 
of Mubi in Adamawa State during a 
night-time raid 
46 people were killed 
19 January 2, 2013 Boko Haram attacked a police station in Song town of Adamawa State 2 policemen and 2 civilians were killed 
20 January 19, 2013 
A bomb attack on a contingent of Mali-
bound Nigerian troops in Kogi State by 
Boko Haram splinter group, Ansaru 
2 soldiers were killed while 5 others were 
seriously injured 
21 January 19, 2013 
Boko Haram attack on the convoy of the 
Emir of Kano, Ado Bayero in Kano 5 people were killed 
22 February 8, 2013 
Gunmen carried out 2 separate attacks 
on 2 clinics in Kano 
10 polio immunization workers were killed 
while 3 others were injured 
23 February 16, 2013 
An attack on a construction firm in 
Jama’are, Bauchi State by Boko Haram 
splinter group, Ansaru 
7 expatriate construction workers were 
kidnapped 
24 February 21,2013 
A suicide blast targeting a military patrol 
vehicle in Maiduguri 
A section of a market and adjoining shops 
as well as a petrol station were burnt 
25 April 16, 2013 
Attack of JTF personnel, Lance Corporal 
Olomoja, in a local convenience in the 
Bulabulin Ward of Baga town 
The death of Lance Corporal Olomoja 
26 April 25, 2013 Attack on Bama town by suspected Boko Haram insurgents 
Death of 21 suspected Boko Haram 
members, 6 policemen, 14 prison officials, 
2 soldiers, and four civilians comprising 
three children and a woman, etc. 
Sources: Authors’ Fieldwork; Human Rights Watch (2012); and www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/boko_haram-200k 
 
4. The Counter-Insurgence Operations of the JTF and Human Rights Abuses in Nigeria 
 
The unprecedented nefarious and inhumane activities orchestrated by the Boko Haram 
fundamentalist Islamist sect have attracted the forceful response of the Federal Government of 
Nigeria. This is made possible through the establishment and deployment of the Joint Task Force 
code-named JTF Operation Restore Order I on 12th June 2011. According to Mohammed 
(2012:28), the JTF comprises personnel from the Nigerian Armed Forces, Nigeria Police Force 
(NPF), the Department of State Security (DSS), Nigerian Customs Service (NCS), Nigeria 
Immigration Service (NIS), and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). The force was founded with 
the mandate of restoring law and order in the North-Eastern parts of Nigeria and Borno State in 
particular. Prior to the founding and deployment of the JTF, the Federal Government had 
established a Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) made up of military personnel from Chad, 
Niger, and Nigeria. The MNJTF came as a direct response to the problem of cross-border crimes 
and arms in-flow orchestrated by illegal aliens and often exacerbated by our porous borders. In 
2012, the three countries extended the mandate of the MNJTF to cover counter-terrorism 
operations. The MNJTF co-exists with the JTF in Borno and other North-Eastern States. Similarly, 
the security situation in Borno State was administered by the state-owned Operation Flush Out 
prior to the establishment of the JTF. It was however later integrated into the JTF. 
As noted earlier, the counter-insurgence operations of the JTF in the Boko Haram infested 
states have intensified the militant activities of the sect, nay, implicated human rights abuses. By 
human rights, the paper refers to the benefits and privileges which an individual is entitled. 
According to Nweke (2004:54), the expression ‘human rights’ can generally be defined as those 
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rights which are inherent in our nature, and without which we cannot live as human beings, and 
without which no society is viable and able to function in the long run. They are rights that a man 
is entitled to for the mere reason that he is a human. These rights are inalienable and fundamental 
to his being and existence; nobody or authority has the right to deny him of such rights. Some of 
these rights are the right to life, right to dignity of human person, right to personal liberty, right to 
fair hearing, right to private and family life, right to freedom of expression and the press, right to 
peaceful assembly and association, etc. 
The ignoble disposition of the members of the JTF contradicts the internationally recognised 
and time-honoured responsibility of the security agencies in the protection and preservation of the 
rights of the citizenry. The Chapter Four of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
and other laws established under it recognize the fundamental rights of the nationals as sacred and 
inalienable. For instance, Sections 33 and 35 of the Constitution guarantee that every person has 
the right to life and personal liberty and shall not be arbitrarily deprived of these rights. The 
Constitution also provides that every citizen is entitled to respect for the dignity of his person, 
including the right not to be subjected to torture. Similarly, Nigeria is a party to several 
international human rights treaties. These include the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which prohibit arbitrary deprivation 
of the right to life, torture and arbitrary arrest and detention. Others are the UN Convention against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment or Punishment which requires 
signatories to investigate and prosecute those who commit torture and compensate those who 
suffer it; the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners which outlines the 
minimum standards for the registration of detainees, detention conditions, visitation rights and 
external inspection of the detention facilities. 
The foregoing provisions notwithstanding, the members of the JTF deployed to the North-East 
have become infamously enmeshed in an orgy of human rights abuses. The Nigerian security 
agents have a long record of human rights abuses, including extra-judicial killings of criminal 
suspects in custody (Amnesty International, 2009; Human Rights Watch, 2005). This is typified in 
the recurrent incidents of human rights violations credited to the JTF. The force has been 
implicated in detention-related abuses, extra-judicial killings and torture. Accordingly, the Human 
Rights Watch (2012:58) reports that: 
during raids in communities, often in the aftermath of Boko Haram attacks, members of the 
security forces have executed men in front of their families; arbitrarily arrested or beaten members 
of the community; burned houses, shops, and cars; stolen money while searching homes; 
and...raped women. Government security agencies routinely hold suspects incommunicado without 
charge or trial in secret detention facilities and have subjected detainees to torture or other 
physical abuse. 
The above report has also been corroborated by the National Human Rights Commission 
(2013) and the Amnesty International (2012). 
The reports by these credible human rights organizations are very weighty. At the outset of 
the uprising in July 2009, the police and soldiers carried out scores of extra-judicial killings of 
detainees. The most typical case was the extra-judicial execution of the erstwhile sect leader, 
Mohammed Yusuf, and other suspected key members of the group during the July 2009 uprising. 
As noted earlier, this practice has exacerbated the attacks of the insurgents on security formations. 
It has ostensibly justified the sect’s claim that they kill security agents in retaliation for the 
summary execution of Mohammed Yusuf and other members of the sect, alleged police abuses like 
arbitrary arrest and torture, as well as the prosecution of its members. Consequently, the Human 
Rights Watch (2012:41) notes that: 
Since 2009, government security services ȸespecially policeȸ have been a primary target of 
Boko Haram. The group has shot and killed police officers on active duty at police stations, 
roadblocks, government buildings, and churches, and has targeted unarmed off-duty officers in the 
street, in barracks, and while drinking in bars. Boko Haram has claimed responsibility for bombing 
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police facilities using improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers. The group has also struck 
at military bases, checkpoints, and vehicles, especially those of the Joint Military Task Force (JTF) 
in Maiduguri. 
Besides extra-judicial execution of suspected Boko Haram members, the JTF has also been 
implicated in other forms of human rights abuses. During raids into communities, soldiers have set 
fire to houses, shops, and cars, randomly arrested men from the neighbourhood, and in some 
cases executed them in front of their shops or houses (Human Rights Watch, 2012:59). One of the 
consequences of this wanton violation of human rights in the region is the growing resentment in 
communities. This has made community members more reluctant to provide information that could 
help curtail the insurgence. Similarly, the alienation of the ordinary people has created more 
distance between the people and the government. This has fundamentally made the whole 
situation dicey. It is virtually impossible to stop the insurgence without being friendly to the host 
community. 
Moreover, the JTF has been associated with detention-related abuses. Many suspected 
members of the sect have been held for months and even years without charge or trial. These 
detainees are often denied the right to communicate with their family and lawyers. Most of them 
have had no charges publicly brought against them. Lengthy pre-trial detention remains a serious 
problem in Nigeria’s criminal justice system. As at the end of 2011, approximately 70 per cent of 
the 48,000 detainees in Nigeria’s prisons had not been triedȸ many of them had been held for 
years without trial (http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dlid 
=186229). The authorities’ failure to respect these due process rights has left detainees particularly 
vulnerable to abuses in police or military custody. 
The most recent incidence of human rights violations in the sub-region is exemplified in the 
counter-insurgence operations of the JTF in Baga town on 16th April, 2013. Baga is a town in 
Borno State, near Nigeria’s north-eastern border with Lake Chad. The incident started, following 
the death of military personnel of the JTF who was ingesting some beverages in a local 
convenience in the Bulabulin Ward in Baga. He was shot dead by a projectile suspected to be a 
bullet discharged by unknown assailants, presumed to be or associated with the Boko Haram sect. 
The fallen soldier was identified as Lance Corporal Olomoja. This is one of many acts of 
provocation with fatal consequences attributed to the sect which apparently inspired or invited a 
firm response by the military deployed to the town. A reinforcement of soldiers from the MNJTF 
returned to the town later in the day and, according to the Police Incident Report cited in The 
National Human Rights Commission (2013:18), the MNJTF started shooting indiscriminately at 
anybody in sight including domestic animals. 
This reaction resulted in loss of lives and massive destruction of properties. The number of 
persons killed or injured became the subject of intense dispute. According to the senator 
representing the zone in the House of Senate, Senator Maina Maaji, up to 228 persons were killed 
in the encounter (http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/baga-mayhem-we-are-still-picking-corpses-
of-women). There are also conflicting claims about the extent of destruction of property. According 
to the Senator, up to 4,000 houses were destroyed mostly by fire. Human Rights Watch (2013:1) 
reports that based on its analysis of geospatial images of the community after the encounter, the 
destruction covered an area of about 80,000 square metres, with at least 2,275 houses destroyed 
and another 125 houses severely damaged. Conversely, the Nigeria’s National Space Research and 
Development Agency (NASRDA), using the same image sets generated by Human Rights Watch as 
well as images from Nigeria’s own NigeriaSat-2 Satellite concluded that the affected area measured 
not more than 54,000 square metres, with an active zone of destruction measured at about 11,000 
square metres (NASRDA, 2013:3). NASRDA therefore concludes from the image overlay analysis 
that the affected area cannot logically house 2,400 damaged buildings claimed to be identified in 
the study by Human Rights Watch. On its part, the Police Incident Report cited in The National 
Human Rights Commission Report (2013:18) notes that:  
At least five wards, namely, Bulabulin, Bayan Tasha, Panpan Gajagaja, Adam Kolo and 
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Bagadaza were completely razed down by the soldiers while properties worth millions of Naira were 
lost through fire which burnt over thirty (30) vehicles, fifty-seven (57) motorcycles, one hundred 
bags of beans/maize. 
The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), in its initial assessment, reports that it 
had recorded at least 642 internally displaced persons in its facilities (National Human Rights 
Commission, 2013:19). The competing claims about the incident in Baga have largely focused on 
the casualty count. Similar rights violations also characterized the counter-insurgence operations of 
the force in Bama town on 25th April, 2013 (http://www.sunnewsonline.com/new/cover/bama-
massacre-army-confirms-47-d-108k-). Table II below shows a tabular representation of the 
chronological list of some victims of human rights abuses orchestrated by the security agents in 
their counter-insurgence operations since 2009. 
 
Table II: Chronology of some Human Rights Abuses by the Security Agents 
S/N Date Place/Event Victim(s)
1 June 11, 2009 Boko Haram funeral procession in Maiduguri 
Shooting of 17 suspected members of Boko Haram over their 
refusal to use motorcycle crash helmet 
2 
Between July 28 
and August 1, 
2009 
Borno, Bauchi, Kano and 
Yobe States 
Extra-judicial execution of the sect’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf 
and 24 other suspected members of the sect 
3 July 31, 2009 His farm settlement outside Maiduguri 
Execution of Buji Foi, a former commissioner in Borno State 
over alleged sponsorship of the sect 
4 July 31, 2009 The Borno State Police Command 
Execution of Baba Fugu Mohammed, the 72-year old father-in-
law of Mohammed Yusuf 
5 January 26, 2012 
Raiding of the Gidan-Yashi 
neighbourhood of 
Maiduguri 
Execution of 3 brothersȸ Dala, Mallam Tijani and Mallam 
Mohammed Mustapher 
6 March 9, 2012 Kano Soldiers gunned down Ali Sadiq, a graduate of Bayero University who got married 5 days before the incident 
7 May 13, 2012 
Pre-dawn raid of Dorayi 
neighbourhood in the city 
of Kano 
Soldiers went from house to house, broke down doors, 
ransacked homes, and in some cases, stole money 
8 March 28, 2012 Disobedience to court order 
Mallam Aliyu Tasheku, a suspected Boko Haram member who 
was granted bail by the court but the police defied the order 
9 April 16, 2013 The Baga Massacre 
There are conflicting reports from Sen. Maina, Human Rights 
Watch, National Human Rights Commission, NASRDA, and 
NEMA. But generally over 200 people died, 642 persons were 
internally displaced, while 2,000 houses, 62 motor vehicles and 
486 motorcycles were destroyed 
10 April 25, 2013 The Bama Massacre 17 persons killed, over 200 houses and shopping malls burnt 
Source: Authors’ Fieldwork 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
The Boko Haram insurgence and the consequent counter-insurgence operations of the JTF have 
vitiated the enjoyment of human rights in the region. The insurrection of the nefarious sect 
constitutes grave human rights violations, nay, crimes against humanity. However, more worrisome 
are the counter-insurgence operations of the JTF deployed to the affected states. These operations 
have been accompanied by serious human rights abuses. The undue attention paid to the activities 
of the JTF is essentially because one person’s atrocity does not excuse another’s. As a special 
component of the Nigerian security apparatus, the JTF is expected to be on the vanguard of 
protecting and promoting human rights in the country. Conversely, the paper finds that the Force 
has not only deviated from its Rules of Engagement but rather become a by-word for the infraction 
of the fundamental rights of nationals. The counter-attacks of the force have culminated in the 
escalation of the insurgence. Despite a continuous and brutal government crackdown aimed at the 
insurgents, civilian casualties and arrests that have further bolstered the insurgence have not 
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abated. Similarly, the extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, burning down 
of houses, shops, cars, and even rape, etc. during raids have engendered mutual suspicion and 
distrust between the JTF and the affected communities. This growing animosity has widened the 
gap between the force and the communities. It has also made the people more reluctant to provide 
relevant information that could facilitate the apprehension of the sect members. 
Arising from the above findings therefore, the following recommendations are proffered: In 
the first place, the government should take urgent measures to address factors that have fuelled 
the insurgence in Nigeria. Particular attention should be paid to the socio-political and economic 
architecture which have been perennially neglected by successive administrations in the country. 
Public resources must be transparently committed to the alleviation of poverty, hunger as well as 
prevention of other forms of socio-economic and political exclusions in the country. Concerted 
efforts should therefore be made to reconcile the paradox of poverty in plenty. In a nutshell, the 
fundamental tenets of good governance that had been hitherto neglected should be imbibed. The 
relevant institutions within the polity should formulate and effectively implement populist policies 
that are capable of addressing the general wellbeing and security of the nationals. Any solution that 
fails to address the underlying primal casus belli in the region and the polity generally will be 
superficial or cosmetic. 
However, in the short-run, the following measures should be implemented in order to at least 
reduce the recurrent cases of rights violations arising from the counter-insurgence operations of 
the JTF in the terrorism-infested states. 
 The government should conduct prompt and thorough investigations into allegations of 
serious crimes committed by government security personnel in violation of the provisions 
of the Nigerian Constitution and international human rights treaties. These include 
arbitrary detention, use of torture, enforced disappearances, deaths in custody, extra-
judicial killings, physical abuse, stealing of property, and burning of homes, shops and 
vehicles. The relevant authorities must prosecute without delay and in accordance with 
international fair trial standards all security personnel implicated in any of the abuses. 
 The National Assembly should enact legislation that criminalizes torture under domestic 
law according to international standards, including the Convention against Torture. 
 The government should protect the due process rights of all the detainees. This could be 
achieved by compiling and making available to those who need it, including detention 
centre inspectors and family members, a list of detention facilities and detainees in 
custody. 
 Detained suspects should be promptly brought to a public civil court and ensure that they 
are either charged with a recognizable crime or released. 
 The government should immediately order security forces to stop all harassment, abuse of 
citizens and the destruction of property, in line with domestic law and international human 
rights standards. 
 Although the Nigerian government has a responsibility to protect its citizens from violence, 
it also has to respect the provisions of Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution and other 
international human rights treaties. It is therefore incumbent on the government to 
respect the laws especially those that deal with the use of force by its security forces, 
treatment of detainees, prohibition of torture, and the obligation to hold speedy and open 
trials. 
 Lastly, the government should remain undaunted in exploring all possible ways of 
dialoguing with the sect. This is essential because conflicts are hardly resolved at the 
battle field but at the negotiation table. In this regard, the 36-man Presidential Committee 
on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North led by the 
Minister for Special Duties, Alhaji Kabiru Turaki, should be encouraged and supported to 
work with genuine Boko Haram members who are willing to renounce militancy. 
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